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INTELLIGENT DESIGN1
Christopher Buccafusco,2 Mark A. Lemley,3 & Jonathan S. Masur4
ABSTRACT

When designers can obtain exclusive intellectual property (IP) rights
in the functional aspects of their creations, they can wield these rights to
increase both the costs to their competitors and the prices that consumers
must pay for their goods. IP rights and the costs they entail are warranted
when they serve as needed incentives to encourage designers to invest in
creating new socially valuable designs. But the law must be wary of
allowing rights to be misused. Accordingly, IP law has employed a series of
doctrinal and costly screens to channel designs into the appropriate
regime—copyright law, design patent law, or utility patent law.
Unfortunately, those screens are no longer working. Designers are able to
obtain powerful IP protection over the utilitarian aspects of their creations
without demonstrating that they have made socially valuable contributions
and without paying substantial fees that weed out weaker designs. This is
bad for competition and bad for consumers.
In this article, we integrate theories of doctrinal and costly screens,
and we explore their roles in channeling IP rights. We demonstrate how
these two types of screens can serve as complements in the efficient
regulation of design protection, and we illustrate the inefficiencies that have
arisen through their misapplication in copyright and design patent laws.
Finally, we propose a variety of solutions that would move design
protection towards a successful channeling regime, balancing the law’s
needs for incentives and competition. Those proposals include improving
doctrinal screens to weed out functionality, making design protection more
costly, and preventing designers from obtaining multiple forms of
protection for the same design.
INTRODUCTION
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Intellectual property (IP) law in the U.S. has two primary regimes
for protecting the aesthetic or ornamental aspects of product design—
copyright law and design patent law.5 In theory, these separate regimes
exist to handle different sorts of products, with different sorts of costs and
benefits arising from IP protection.6 Copyright protection is available for
any works that are at least trivially original and creative, it arises without
registration or substantial examination, and it lasts for about a century.7
Design patent protection, by contrast, is only available for inventions that
are novel and nonobvious, it requires an application and pre-grant
examination to commence, and it lasts for only fifteen years.8 Based on
these differences, any rational designer would clearly prefer copyright
protection over design patent protection.
Traditionally, however, copyright law’s useful articles doctrine has
prevented many designers from taking advantage of its lower threshold and
longer duration.9 The useful articles doctrine channeled functional designs
into the design patent regime rather than the copyright regime.10 Only
works that had significant, independent aesthetic content—and only that
aesthetic content—could receive copyright protection. Any aspect of a
design that was partly functional could not be protected under copyright.11
While copyright law typically screened out functional aspects of
works from protection, design patent law has made it easier to protect
functional works. Design patent protection is supposed to extend only to the
ornamental aspects of a work, but design patent law–unlike copyright law–
has traditionally given at least some protection to parts of a work that are
both ornamental and functional.12 When IP law grants protection to useful
or functional features of a product rather than merely aesthetic or
ornamental ones, it can convey substantial market power on those holding
the right.13 This market power can harm both consumers, who must pay
higher prices, and subsequent designers and inventors, who must license the
existing IP or find ways to design around it.14 Accordingly, IP law should
5
A third regime – trademark law – is also sometimes used to protect designs. We treat
trademark law separately in this Article. See infra Part II.C.
6
By “product design” we refer to a wide variety of products in the fields of applied art and
industrial design, including consumer electronics, clothing, bicycles, furniture, and automobiles.
7
See infra notes 80-88.
8
See infra notes 119-122.
9
17 U.S.C. § 101.
10
Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Screening Functionality, VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (explaining why functionality can lead to market
control).
14
See Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Nature of
Sequential Innovation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (describing and analyzing the
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carefully channel designers into either design patents or copyrights,
depending on what they have created. And it should reserve protection for
functional elements for utility patent law, which has still higher thresholds
for protection.
If IP law allows claimants to gain some protection for functional
aspects of a design, it should not do so easily or cheaply. It should insist that
they have contributed something of high value, and it should be circumspect
about the protection it offers. In this Article, we explain how IP law can and
should use two separate techniques—doctrinal screens and costly screens—
to make sure that designs are channeled to the appropriate regime and
receive efficient protection. Doctrinal screens use substantive legal rules the
exclude certain sorts of claims from a given regime. Different IP regimes’
varying creativity thresholds and functionality prohibitions are doctrinal
screens. Costly screens, by contrast, channel designs into different regimes
by altering the costs of obtaining rights.15 The costs of applying for a patent,
including the fees that an applicant must pay to the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), create costly screens that discourage certain claimants from
seeking protection. We demonstrate how IP law can effectively use
doctrinal and costly screens in tandem to optimize design innovation.
The system that has been in place for channeling designs between
copyright, design patent, and utility patent laws should work well if it were
operating as intended. Copyright law has a low creativity threshold and a
costless screen, but its high functionality bar should channel utilitarian
creations to design patent law. There they would meet a high doctrinal
creativity screen and a costly application screen. The combination of high
doctrinal and costly screens should minimize the costs of letting the
inventor control some aspect of functionality by limiting protection to
designs that are most likely to have high social value and restricting the
control that such rights give.16
Unfortunately, however, the actual operation of IP’s channeling
techniques is very different. Neither copyright law nor design patent law
apply the sorts of screens that theory and law require. Consider first
copyright law after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Star Athletica v.
Varsity Brands.17 That opinion fundamentally alters copyright law’s
functionality screen, allowing highly functional products to obtain
copyrights. As a result, a variety of products that the law had excluded from
the realm of copyright may now be able to take advantage of its low
choice between using existing IP or inventing around it); infra note 44 and accompanying text.
15
Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010);
David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 681
(2012) (discussing the social value of costly screens).
16
We discuss the operation of these screens in detail infra Part I.
17
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002 (2017).
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creativity threshold, lack of examination, and long duration to gain
competitive advantages over functional product features.
Things are even worse in design patent law. As we explained above,
design patent law is intended to impose three limits on its use: a high
creativity threshold, expensive examination, and short duration. In fact,
though, none of these features have proved especially significant.18 And
while design patent duration is relatively short, the difference between it
and copyright duration will often be insignificant because even fifteen years
will far exceed the design’s lifecycle.19 Thus, design patent law also isn’t
doing much of a job of imposing doctrinal or costly screens.
Consider, for example, the numerous design patents that cover
incredibly trivial ornamentation like a triangular marking post,20
crisscrossed straps on a sports bra,21 or a skull-shaped vodka bottle.22 All of
these designs cleared the PTO’s novelty and non-obviousness screens and
have been asserted in litigation against competitors.23 To make matters
worse, the plaintiffs’ claims won’t be limited to nonfunctional aspects of
their designs. In Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co. Inc., the plaintiff
asserted a design patent that covered the shape of a life-jacket flotation
device with armbands.24 The design, shape, and placement of the armbands
were determined by the size of human bodies and their ability to keep the
wearer afloat, making them highly functional.25 That is, for these types of
flotation devices, function determined form. Nevertheless, in a 2016
opinion the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the design’s
functional elements should be construed as part of the claim, along with any
ornamental elements.26 This substantially broadened the plaintiff’s design
patent rights to cover the design’s utility. In doing so, the opinion gave the
plaintiff the ability to block competitors who attempt to market flotation
devices that perform the function in the same way, even if they have no
desire to copy the ornamental elements of the flotation devices. This will
increase costs to other designers and, ultimately, to consumers.
In sum, then, the problem is simple, if counterintuitive: it is too
cheap and too easy to get design protection from various IP regimes, and
the current rules make that protection too strong. The operation of these
laws does an insufficient job of protecting consumers and promoting
18
See Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161 (2015) (hereinafter Patented
Design).
19
See infra notes 222-223 and accompanying text.
20
U.S. Patent No. D525,721 (July 25, 2006).
21
U.S. Patent No. D709,668 (July 29, 2014).
22
U.S. Patent No. D589,360 (Mar. 31, 2009).
23
For more examples, see design-law.tumblr.com.
24
Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 820 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
25
Id. at 1322.
26
Id. at 1322-23.
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sequential innovation. We offer a series of suggestions to bring design
protection more in line with social welfare. First, we might require
designers to elect either copyright or design patent protection, or at least
require designers to disclaim any copyright term after design patent
protection ceases. That was the rule before 1974, and it would solve many
of the problems that stem from overlapping protection.27 Second, we could
weaken the rights that both copyright and design patent now provide so
there is less incentive to overclaim design rights. While Star Athletica is a
large step backwards in this regard, courts still have room to reinvigorate
the doctrinal screens governing copyright and design patent. And both the
PTO and the courts could begin applying an appropriately rigorous
creativity threshold for design patents. Congress could also step in to
prevent abuse of design rights, for example by incorporating an independent
invention defense into design patent law. Finally, consistent with previous
work that one of us has done,28 it may be that it is simply too cheap to
obtain strong design rights. We suggest that the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) increase application and maintenance fees for design patents
and use the money for improved examination.
Our aim is not to render design protection ineffective. Others can
and have disagreed about the importance of IP rights to design.29 Rather,
our goal is to try to align the private and social value of design rights in IP
to prevent overclaiming and abuse of those rights. As the system currently
stands, that means we need to make design rights weaker, harder to get, or
both.
In Part I, we explain why functionality is important to the choice of
IP regimes. In Part II, we discuss the theory behind doctrinal and costly
screens and how Congress attempted to use them to channel designs into the
appropriate IP regime. When operating properly, these screens could
provide appropriate incentives to designers while minimizing social costs.
Unfortunately, as we document in Part III, design screening is not working,
leaving us with a system that may be the worst of all possible worlds. In
Part IV, we offer several possible solutions to this problem.
I. THE CENTRALITY OF FUNCTIONALITY

27

In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
Masur, supra note 15, at 687; Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, at 692(discussing the social
value of costly screens).
29
See Burstein, Patented Design, supra note 18, at 163; Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77
OHIO ST. L.J. 107 (2016) (hereinafter Costly Designs); Mark McKenna & Katherine Strandburg,
Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2013); Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder,
The Law of Look and Feel, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017).
28
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IP laws exist to encourage the production of socially valuable
creations and innovations by granting people certain exclusive rights to the
works and inventions they produce.30 When authors and inventors obtain
these rights, they can charge higher prices for the goods that embody their
works and inventions than they otherwise could.31 These higher prices
provide an economic incentive to engage in the costly and risky efforts that
creating and innovating entail.32
But IP rights also impose costs of their own. By granting some
people rights to make certain products, IP laws make purchasing those
products more expensive for consumers, many of whom will be entirely
priced out the market.33 In addition, IP rights also can impose substantial
costs on other creators who want to develop their own works and inventions
or improve existing ones. They now have to pay license fees or engage in
costly and risky efforts to design around existing rights.34 For these reasons,
IP laws—including those that protect design—attempt to balance the
incentives provided to the current round of creators and the costs imposed
on consumers and the next round of creators.35
At the center of this question is whether or to what extent the IP
right can be used to protect utilitarian or functional aspects in claimed
works and inventions.36 Society stands to benefit when innovators develop
30

Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property and the Promotion of
Welfare, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2 (Ben
Depoorter
&
Peter
Menell,
eds.,
forthcoming
2018),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2905936.
31
WILLAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2003).
32
Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[Copyright] is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws promote
this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk
the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby
fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better
lives for our citizens.”).
33
Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic
Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 282 (2014); Mark A.
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129
(2004).
34
Id; Buccafusco, Bechtold & Sprigman, supra note 14.
35
Lemley, supra note 33Error! Bookmark not defined..
36
This is not the only reason for the doctrinal differences between the regimes. Scholars have
asserted numerous rationales to explain, for example, why copyright and patent laws impose different
creativity thresholds. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV.
465, 495 (2004); Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983); 1 PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1 (3d ed. 2013); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (2010) (utilizing the psychology of creativity to
analyze the differences in protectability standards between patent and copyright law).
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new techniques to build safer buildings or more efficient appliances and to
better treat diseases.37 But often there are only a limited number of ways to
design utilitarian products.38 Scientists and engineers have only discovered
so many ways of safely and effectively treating high blood pressure or
designing anti-lock brakes. This means that granting inventors exclusive
control over the utilitarian features of product design can also give them
substantial market power and enable them to price access to those products
far above their marginal cost.39 For example, brand name pharmaceuticals
sell for much higher prices when they are covered by a patent than after
generic producers have entered the market.40
Accordingly, IP law must be careful about granting exclusive rights
to utilitarian features of products. The utility patent regime is the principal
home for scientific and technical inventions that improve the ways products
work.41 But a variety of utility patent law doctrines stringently police access
to exclusive rights. An inventor seeking a utility patent must prove that her
invention is “novel”42 and “nonobvious”43—not only that she is the first to
create it, but also that it is more than the predictable combination of preexisting elements. The inventor must also demonstrate that the invention is
useful and describe how it should be used.44 Moreover, all of this must be
proved to the satisfaction of an examiner at the Patent and Trademark
Office before a utility patent is issued.
Given these high demands on functional inventions, some
innovators attempt to skirt the rigors of utility patent law by seeking
37

See Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 33.
One example is the pocket multi-tool described by U.S. Design Patent 707,091. The device
comprises several tools built into one small structure, including a bottle opener, screwdriver,
smartphone kickstand, set of hex wrenches, and so forth. The device is only able to perform these
functions because of its shape and design, and thus design and function are inextricably linked.
Nonetheless, the PTO allowed a patent on the device, which the owner asserted. See, e.g., Caffeinate
Labs, Inc. v. Vante, Inc., 2017 WL 2889031, at 2 (D. Mass. 2017).
39
We do not suggest that exclusive rights covering aesthetic or ornamental aspects of product
design could never convey market power. If they did not provide at least some ability to price
products above marginal cost, copyrights and design patents would have no meaningful incentive
effects. We merely claim that, given a certain scope for IP rights, those covering functional or
utilitarian aspects of design are likely to convey more market power because of the limited range of
competitive options.
40
Rena M. Conti & Ernst R. Berndt, Specialty Drug Prices and Utilization after Loss of U.S.
Patent Exclusivity, 2001-2007, in MEASURING AND MODELING HEALTH CARE COSTS (Ana Aizcorbe et
al., eds.) available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c13100.
41
Mark M. McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman, What’s In, and What’s Out: How IP’s
Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017).
42
35 U.S.C. § 102.
43
35 U.S. C. § 103 ([A patent] may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the claimed invention pertains.”).
44
In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
38
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protection through either the copyright or design patent regimes. Doing so
would provide a mechanism for them to obtain “backdoor utility patents.”45
I might not be able to patent the wheel; I’m not the first inventor. But if I
can get a copyright in my round design I might effectively get some of the
same control over the wheel without having to clear the novelty and
nonobviousness hurdles. Thus, the copyright and design patent regimes
must themselves police creators’ attempts to gain IP protection for
functional features of their products without spending the time and money
and meeting the higher standards of utility patent law. As we explain below,
IP law serves to channel different sorts of creations into the appropriate
doctrinal home based on their degree of functionality. Depending on a
product’s functionality, it is eligible for copyright, design patent, or utility
patent protection. Each of these doctrines imposes different sorts of hurdles,
treats functional features in different ways, and creates different sorts of
rights.46
As applied to design law, the differences between these IP
regimes—and the screens that separate them—are driven largely by the
extent to which they can be used to protect functional inventive elements.
The critical question is whether and to what extent the IP regime can be
used to claim exclusive rights over a utilitarian invention that performs
some function rather than merely the designs or ornamentations that are
layered over or intertwined with that invention. There are many other
differences between these IP regimes, including the damages that plaintiffs
can obtain and the defenses available to accused infringers, and we will
discuss a variety of these distinctions. But our focus is on functionality,
because it is through the protection of function that a creator can turn a
design right into a powerful market position.
Ideally, utility patent, design patent, and copyright laws work
together to appropriately channel different kinds of creations into the
correct legal regime—the one that maximizes the law’s benefits net of
costs. In the next section we explain the tools the law uses to perform this
channeling.
II. SCREENS AT THE INTERSECTION OF COPYRIGHT
AND DESIGN PATENT

45

Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10; Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor
Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473
(2004).
46
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10; Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the
Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protections, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2908496; McKenna & Sprigman, supra note
41; Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611 (2014).
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Before the government awards a valid design right to a private party,
it must have some way of determining that doing so will further the goals of
the IP system. One way to do this is to limit protection to designs that meet
certain doctrinal thresholds.47 A court, and sometimes also the PTO,
scrutinizes the design to determine whether it warrants protection under the
relevant IP doctrines. But doctrine is only one tool for screening out
designs that do not deserve protection. In addition, the government uses
costly screens—fees and other expenses that someone seeking an IP right
must pay—as a means of screening out rights that would do more social
harm than good.48
These two approaches can be complementary and are frequently
applied in tandem. Indeed, doctrinal screens often serve as a driver of
costly screens. The higher the doctrinal threshold that a party must pass in
order to claim a right, the more that party will have to spend—in attorney’s
fees and other costs—in perfecting and obtaining the right. And the more
expensive it is to obtain the right, the more important it must be to make it
worth the trouble of trying to obtain it. The laws establishing utility patents,
design patents, and copyrights, and delineating the boundaries between the
three, all balance costs and benefits. Importantly, however, each of these
fields attempts to strike this sort of balance in different ways. They differ in
terms of how easily rights are granted, and with respect to the scope and
duration of the rights that people receive. Accordingly, the screens that
separate the three fields, and that separate protectable from unprotectable
creations within each field, are different as well.49
In the sections that follow, we describe the operation of these
screens and the ways in which they do or do not achieve optimal policy
objectives. First, however, we begin by describing the operation of screens
in general and the manner in which they are designed to function.
A.

The Theory Behind Doctrinal and Costly Screens

As we described in Part I, IP protection involves tradeoffs between
social benefits and costs. The goal of the IP system is to grant rights only
when doing so will produce net social benefits.50 In addition, the strength
of the IP right determines both the incentive it creates to produce further
creativity and also the costs it imposes on third parties. The stronger the
47

See Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher Jon
Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1921 (2014).
48
Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, at 684; Masur, supra note 15, at 693.
49
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10.
50
See Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 33 (explaining the policy aims behind a coherent system
of IP rules).
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right, the greater the incentives it creates, but also the greater the costs it
imposes. Given a menu of different IP rights, the legal system should grant
the appropriate right to maximize net social benefits relative to other kinds
of rights.51 Screens affect these tradeoffs by ensuring that not every right is
granted to every party that seeks it and that the parties who do get rights get
the appropriate ones, not ones that are too strong or too weak.
Accordingly, one naïve theory of screens would hold that stronger
IP rights should be accompanied by higher and costlier screens.52 Before a
party can obtain a more valuable right, it should be forced to pass a more
rigorous test, satisfy a higher legal standard, pay higher costs, and so forth.
This approach is facially plausible and perhaps intuitively appealing, but it
is also wrong. The reason is that the objective of a screen is not merely to
block the strongest or most powerful IP rights. After all, some of these
rights are also the most socially valuable, in that they have encouraged the
most beneficial research.53 In some cases, strong rights may be necessary to
provide powerful incentives to create. Rather, the objective of a screen is to
separate those rights that are net socially valuable from those that are net
socially harmful, allowing the former and blocking the latter.54 Moreover,
in the case of designs, where creators have multiple options for obtaining
IP, the objective behind these screens is to channel creators into selecting
the type of IP protection that will generate the greatest social benefits net of
costs.55
As noted above, we can limit access to IP rights in two fundamental
ways – by imposing doctrinal barriers a creator must clear or by raising the
cost of obtaining a right. We call the former approach “doctrinal screens”
and the latter “costly screens.” Doctrinal screens and costly screens operate
in slightly different ways. A doctrinal screen acts as a firm bar against
certain types of design rights. If the design does not satisfy the necessary
doctrinal conditions, it does not qualify for protection. A properly
calibrated doctrinal screen will refuse protection to designs when the social
costs of granting a design right outweigh the benefits. Consider, for
example, a creativity threshold for IP rights. By imposing such a threshold,
the law judges that designs that cannot meet some standard of cleverness or
novelty are unlikely to generate sufficient social benefits to justify the costs
associated with IP protection.56 This is a type of doctrinal screen. Costly
51

Id.
See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, at 704 (describing and rejecting this theory).
53
Id. at 713.
54
Id. at 692.
55
Cf. MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 32
(2006) (describing the object of social planners as maximizing benefits net of costs).
56
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1578
(2003) (explaining patent law’s utilitarian framework and the ways in which IP laws are calibrated to
generate net social benefits).
52
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screens, on the other hand, force applicants to choose whether or not to
pursue a certain type of design right.57 That is, whether a not an applicant
could qualify for a right doctrinally, she must determine whether or not the
costs of obtaining and keeping the right are worth it to her.58
B.

Private Value, Social Value, and Screens

The law’s goal in applying either sort of screen is to align private
incentives with social value. We can think of design rights as falling into
one of four categories based on the relationship between private and social
value.59 First, consider the private value of the right—the value of the right
to its owner. IP rights can have “low” private value, meaning that putative
owners will not be able to generate significant income from the ownership
of the right. Or they can have “high” private value, meaning that putative
owners will be able to generate significant income from the ownership of
the right. This income could arise through making products covered by the
right, licensing the right to others, or litigation over the right.
Second, consider the social value of the right—whether the right
produces net costs or net benefits for society. IP rights can have positive
social value or negative social value. Thus, there are four categories of
rights: high private value/positive social value rights; high private
value/negative social value rights; low private value/positive social value
rights; and low private value/negative social value rights.

Private value

TABLE 1: FOUR POSSIBLE TYPES OF IP RIGHTS
Social value
1. High private
value/Positive social
value
3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

2. High private
value/Negative social
value
4. Low private
value/Negative social
value

Doctrinal screens are meant to separate rights based upon social
value. They should prohibit the creation of IP rights that are predicted to
57

Masur, supra note 15, at 688.
Id. at 688-90.
59
This two-by-two categorization was initially laid out in Masur, supra note 15, and Fagundes
& Masur, supra note 15. In those earlier works, the authors referred to “low social value” and “high
social value” rights. Here, for greater clarity, we describe them as “negative social value” and
“positive social value” rights. The categorization is identical; only the nomenclature has changed
slightly.
58
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have negative net social value. That is, a well-calibrated doctrinal screen is
meant to draw a vertical line between the positive social value rights in
boxes 1 and 3 from the negative social value rights in boxes 2 and 4,
permitting the former and blocking the latter.

Private value

TABLE 2: IDEALIZED DOCTRINAL SCREEN
Social value
1. High private
value/Positive social
value
3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

2. High private
value/Negative social
value
4. Low private
value/Negative social
value

Consider, for instance, the requirement that utility and design
patents must be new and nonobvious. The purpose of patents is to create
incentives for new and valuable innovation. Absent new innovation, patents
are unlikely to create positive social value. Accordingly, the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements are meant to screen out those patent
applications that did not involve any socially valuable innovation and—if
they were granted—would be likely to do net social harm.60 Other doctrinal
tests, such as the utility requirement for utility patents and the
idea/expression distinction in copyright law, perform similar functions.
Of course, even well-calibrated doctrinal screens will not function
perfectly. Requirements such as novelty and nonobviousness are only
proxies for positive social value. For instance, imagine a design patent
application involving a new and nonobvious design, but one that the
designer would have created whether or not she was able to obtain a
patent.61 A patent on this design would create negative social value, because
(a) the valuable design would exist regardless, and (b) the patent will
increase costs for consumers and subsequent designers. Merely satisfying
doctrinal IP requirements does not guarantee that the IP right will
necessarily create social value. And of course not all doctrines are properly
calibrated, nor are they always properly applied. The doctrine might be too
lax or too stringent, and courts or the PTO may err when evaluating whether
a given right satisfies the doctrinal requirements. Thus, no IP doctrine
60

See Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017).
61
See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120
YALE L.J. 1590 (2011).
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actually succeeds in drawing a perfect vertical line down the center of Table
1. Any system of doctrine will inevitably permit some negative social value
rights to see the light of day and block some positive social value rights.
Accordingly, even if doctrinal screens are well-calibrated—and certainly if
they are not—there is a potential role for some other type of screen to play.

Private value

TABLE 3: REALISTIC DOCTRINAL SCREEN
Social value
1. High private
value/Positive social
value
3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

2. High private
value/Negative social
value
4. Low private
value/Negative social
value

Enter the possibility of costly screens. A costly screen is simply a
requirement that an applicant expend some amount of money to obtain,
maintain, or enforce a given legal right. The costly screen can take the form
of an application fee, a maintenance fee, or a fee that must be paid for
litigating a given right. Costly screens may also arise because compliance
with some aspect of the law is expensive, such as the need to hire a lawyer
to prosecute a patent. Because it is the IP applicant or owner who must bear
the expense, costly screens affect IP rights differentially based upon their
private value. That is, a costly screen draws a horizontal line between the
high private value rights in boxes 1 and 2 and the low private value rights in
boxes 3 and 4. For high private value rights, costly screens are irrelevant. If
the rights are highly valuable to their potential owner, the owner will invest
the money to obtain them regardless of the cost.62 The screen will only
serve to run up the costs of such owners.

Private value

TABLE 4: IDEALIZED COSTLY SCREEN
Social value

62

1. High private
value/Positive social
value
3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, at 692.

2. High private
value/Negative social
value
4. Low private
value/Negative social
value
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Thus, costly screens are a second-best solution because they will not
eliminate IP rights that fall into box 2, namely rights that have high private
value (so creators will pay to obtain them) but negative social value. For
example, if someone could claim the exclusive right to publish stories about
star-crossed lovers she would be able to obtain substantial private value
from doing so, but that would clearly make society worse off. No costly
screen would prevent a creator from applying for a copyright or patent on
such a valuable idea. A doctrinal screen is necessary. For this reason,
copyright law’s idea/expression doctrine prevents people from obtaining
such rights.63 No matter how much people would be willing to pay to obtain
a copyright over an idea or a utility patent over a product of nature,
doctrinal screens prevent them from doing so.64

Private value

TABLE 5: DOCTRINAL AND COSTLY SCREENS IN COMBINATION
Social value
1. High private
value/Positive social
value
3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

2. High private
value/Negative social
value
4. Low private
value/Negative social
value

Instead, the function of a costly screen is to eliminate or curtail the
number of low private value IP rights. If the costly screen exceeds the
value of the right to its putative owner, the owner will not seek (or maintain,
or enforce) the IP right. Of course, the private value of the right is not what
policymakers really care about—their focus is the social value of the right.65
Costly screens will reduce the number of low private value/negative social
value rights—box 4—which is good, but they will also reduce the number
of low private value/positive social value rights—box 3—which is bad.66
Accordingly, costly screens are appropriate when the number of potential
low private value/negative social value rights is high and the number of
potential low private value/positive social value rights is low, and they are
63

17 U.S.C. 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
64
See 35 U.S.C. § 101; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980); Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
65
Id. at 695-97.
66
Id. at 695-98.
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counterproductive when the reverse is true.67 On the other hand, costly
screens are ill-advised in cases where policymakers believe that there are
likely to be few low private value/negative social value rights (box 4) but
many low private value/high social value rights (box 3). Here, a costly
screen would do more harm than good by eliminating too many rights that
produce net social value.
Doctrinal screens and costly screens are complements, not
substitutes. They can and do exist side-by-side in a wide variety of legal
regimes.68 At the boundary between copyrights, design patents, and utility
patents, doctrinal screens and costly screens play important supplementary
roles. Doctrinal screens sort designs between the copyright, design patent,
and utility patent regimes, determining which will qualify for each category.
And then within those three doctrinal regimes, costly screens (or their
absence) determine the types of rights that creators will seek to obtain. For
the system to function properly, the two types of screens must be wellcalibrated to perform these operations in tandem.
C.

Doctrinal Screens and the Selection of IP Regimes

Now that we have laid out the principles behind doctrinal and costly
screens, we turn our attention to the IP doctrines through which these
screens are meant to operate.
Because our focus is functionality, our baseline is the utility patent
regime. Utility patents were designed to protect functional inventions, and
indeed they can only be used to protect functional inventions.69 Before an
inventor can obtain a utility patent, however, she must surmount a series of
doctrinal and costly screens that are implemented (directly or indirectly)
through examination by the PTO. The inventor must demonstrate to the
PTO that her invention is within the realm of utility patent law,70 is new and
nonobvious,71 is sufficiently developed and disclosed,72 and that it has
useful applications.73 In addition, as one of us has written, the high cost of
obtaining a utility patent functions as a costly screen that eliminates a
significant number of low private value rights.74 The PTO’s examination of
67

Id. at 703-07 (describing the general point in the context of copyright and patent law).
Doctrinal screens can also create costly screens. For example, trade dress law’s requirement
that a claimant must establish that the design has secondary meaning as a designation of source will
typically involve the expenditure of substantial resources on advertising. See infra note XX.
69
See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017).
70
35 U.S.C. § 101 (patentable subject matter).
71
35 U.S.C. § 102 (novel); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (nonobvious).
72
35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring that the invention be described and enabled).
73
Id.
74
Masur, supra note 15, at 701.
68
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patents is not always rigorous or effective, and the costly screen imposed is
not terribly high when compared with the most valuable patents.75
Nonetheless, utility patent law couples the IP regime that is most protective
of functionality with the most stringent doctrinal and costly barriers to
entry. In the sections that follow, we compare copyright law and design
patent law against this baseline. We explore the extent to which they can be
used to obtain “backdoor” protection for functional elements and the legal
responses to the possibility of such protection.
Our primary focus is on utility patents, design patents, and
copyrights, not on trademark law. Although each of these fields falls under
the rubric of intellectual property protection, their foundations differ in
important ways. Congress’s power to grant copyrights and patents is
grounded in the progress clause of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.76
Copyrights and patents are intended to stimulate creativity and innovation.
In the context of product designs, this means that Congress should use its
power to grant copyrights and patents over product designs to optimize
innovation in the field.
Trademark law is—or at least is supposed to be—different.
Congress’s power to establish and protect trademarks comes from the
commerce clause of the Constitution,77 and that power is exercised, not
primarily to incent producers, but rather to protect consumers from
confusion in the market.78 Trademarks, which can include the design of
product or its trade dress, prevent consumers from being misled about, for
75
See id.; Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1508-11 (2001); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 130-33 (2004);
Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559,
1567 (2006) (“Fee diversion has impoverished the PTO, making it difficult for the Office to search or
examine prior art comprehensively.”); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 53 (2007); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the
Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
2051, 2062-63 (2009); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67
(2013) (arguing that the PTO grants too many patents in order to earn maintenance fees).
76
Art I, s. 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the power . . . To promote the progress of science and
useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings
and discoveries.”
77
Art. I, s. 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have the power…To regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
78
See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 31, at 167–68; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004); Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525–27 (1988) (discussing
the economic benefits of marks that apprise consumers of products' unobservable features); Nicholas
S. Economides, Trademarks, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 602
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing the savings for consumers in product searches as one of “[t]he
primary reasons for the existence and protection of trademarks”). Cf. Mark P. McKenna, The
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007) (arguing that
trademark law before the 20th century was based on unfair competition rather than consumer
protection, but noting that they are both serving similar goals in protecting a functioning market).
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example, whether a particular shoe is made by Converse or not.79 To the
extent that Congress allows designers to claim exclusive rights to product
designs via trade dress law it is not doing so to promote innovative designs.
But because trade dress does, in fact, affect innovation in design, we
address its interactions with copyright and patent law in Part II.
1. Copyright Law
On its face, copyright law would appear to be the most favorable
place for creators to turn in search of backdoor utility patents, because
copyright law imposes the lowest creativity threshold for protection, and,
once granted, copyright protection lasts the longest. To prevent this sort of
doctrinal arbitrage, copyright has imposed the strictest set of functionality
screens, traditionally limiting its availability only to works with no, or very
modest amounts of, functionality.
Obtaining a copyright is incredibly easy. Federal copyright
protection exists from the moment that a works is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.80 Creators need not demonstrate any substantial
cleverness to obtain copyright protection.81 A work is protectable if it is
original, which means that it was not copied from another source and that it
evinces some more than entirely trivial degree of creativity.82 So while the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected a copyright claim for a telephone book white
pages directory because it was insufficiently original and creative,83 courts
have upheld protection for yellow pages directories,84 fairly simple
photographs,85 and three-note sequences of music.86 Copyright law sets the
creativity hurdle incredibly low, enabling virtually any work with a spark of
cleverness or novelty to sail over.87
Copyright law is also cheap. Authors don’t need to pay any money
or file any paperwork to obtain copyright protection.88 Every reader of this
79

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763.
Christopher Jon Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 485 (2004).
81
Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
82
17 U.S.C. 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression…”).
83
Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
84
See Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Pub. Enterprises, Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2nd
Cir. 1991).
85
See Schrock v. Learning Curve Intern., Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Mannion v. Coors
Brewing Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). But see Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 225 F.3d
1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
86
See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2014) (assuming without deciding
that a three-note sequence of a musical composition could have evinced sufficient originality to be
copyrightable).
87
Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 464, 488–89 (2009);
Buccafusco, Burns, Fromer & Sprigman, supra note 47.
88
17 U.S.C. § 408 (noting that “registration is not a condition of copyright protection”).
80
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article has created at least one and probably several copyrights today, just
by living an ordinary life. Creators need not register their works with the
Copyright Office, although they may do so for a nominal fee,89 and the
Office will generally grant registration without meaningful examination of
the claimed work.90 If they do want the additional benefits of copyright
registration, creators can pay $40 and fill out a very simple form online,91
no lawyers or bankers required. For this nominal sum, they get quite a bit.
Copyright protection isn’t just easy to obtain; it also lasts for a really long
time.92 Most copyrights last for about a century or more.93
Copyright law offers creators a regime without meaningful
examination, a trivial creativity bar, and incredibly long protection. Creators
who cannot meet utility patent law’s strict utility and nonobviousness
requirements or who desire longer protection are often tempted to seek
copyright protection instead. To combat this behavior, Congress created
strict functionality screens that would prevent misuse.94 In some cases,
copyright law simply denies protection to entire categories of works
because they are deemed too functional.95 However expressive cooking or
yoga might be, creators cannot rely on copyright law for protection in these
fields.96 In other cases, such as computer software, copyright law allows
limited protection for the relatively few expressive aspects of such works
while also filtering out any of their functional content from protection.97
89
Id. § 408 (“At any time during the subsistence of the first term of copyright in any published
or unpublished work in which the copyright was secured before January 1, 1978, and during the
subsistence of any copyright secured on or after that date, the owner of copyright or of any exclusive
right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office
the deposit specified by this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections
409 and 708. Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.”).
90
See Thomas G. Field, Jr., Judicial Review of Copyright Examination, 44 IDEA 479 (2004).
91
See https://www.copyright.gov/registration/.
92
17 U.S.C. § 302.
93
Id. For many works, copyrights lasts for the life of the author plus an additional seventy years
postmortem. Id. For other works, including works made for hire or works created before 1978,
copyright typically lasts for 95 years from the date of first publication. Id.
94
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10; Samuelson, supra note 46.
95
Buccafusco and Lemley refer to this as an “Exclusion Screen.” Buccafusco & Lemley, supra
note 10.
96
Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996); Lorenzana v. South
American Rest. Corp., 799 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2015) (denying copyright protection to chicken
sandwich); Bikram’s Yoga College of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.
2015) (denying copyright protection to a series of yoga poses). See also Christopher Buccafusco,
Authorship and the Boundaries of Copyright: Ideas, Expressions, and Functions in Yoga,
Choreography, and Other Works, 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 421 (2016); Christopher Buccafusco, On the
Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1107 (2007); Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual
Property Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2012).
97
Computer Associates International v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). See also, Pamela
Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests of Software
Copyright Infringement (UC Berkeley Public Law, Working Paper No. 2667740, 2015,
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Copyright protection, if it exists for a computer program, should not cover
any of its aspects that relate to efficiency or compatibility, leaving those
free for others to copy and use.98
Most important for design, however, is the regime that Congress
created for handling pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. Congress was
concerned that industrial designers would attempt to use copyright law to
gain exclusive rights over the designs of “useful articles” such as clothing,
furniture, or appliances.99 Because these items are intrinsically functional,
easily obtainable exclusive rights could create substantial and unwarranted
costs for the public and on subsequent creators.100 To avert this risk, the
Copyright Act imposes additional eligibility criteria on useful articles.101
Such works are copyrightable only if and only to the extent that they
contain “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.”102
The useful articles doctrine was intended to exclude from copyright
law works of industrial design, including the creativity and innovation
associated with successfully marrying form and function.103 The artistic yet
simultaneously functional design of a chair leg, automobile hood,
smartphone, or garment were unprotectable via copyright.104 Protection
could extend only to purely non-functional features of useful articles such
as a hood ornament or printed decal. That is, copyright would only attach to
features of a work that existed solely to portray its appearance or convey
information.105
For example, the Second Circuit denied the designer of the “Ribbon
Rack” bicycle rack copyright protection even though the work was
aesthetically appealing and had won numerous design awards.106 The
aspects of the design that were expressive, such as the shape of its curves,
were also intrinsically related to its functionality. By contrast, the same
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2667740); Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API
Copyright Dead: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of Network and Functional Features
of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017).
98
See, e.g., Computer Associates Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); but see Oracle
America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
99
17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”).
100
See Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion’s Function, NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
101
Id.
102
17 U.S.C. § 101.
103
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 49-50, 54-55, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5662-63, 5667-68.
104
Id.
105
17 U.S.C. s 101 (defining “useful article”). See Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note XX.
106
Brandir v. Cascade Int’l, 834 F.2d 1142 (2nd Cir. 1987) (considering the functionality of an
artistic bicycle rack).
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court upheld copyrights in decorative belt buckles, because the buckles’
shape did not affect their utility and was entirely superimposed on the
functional aspects of the designs.107 Thus, copyright law’s useful articles
doctrine allowed creators to obtain protection for solely non-functional
aspects of their designs, but it rejected claims based on design elements that
intermixed functional and non-functional components.108
Beyond the useful articles doctrine, copyright law also includes a
variety of other features meant to balance its power and scope. On one
hand, copyright law offers reasonably broad protection against competition.
Copyright owners can prevent not only literal or exact duplications of their
designs but also those that are substantially similar to them.109 This can
include works that have the same “aesthetic appeal” as the copyrighted
work.110 On the other hand, copyright law limits this otherwise broad scope
in a number of ways. First, copyright only prohibits actual copying: a
designer sued for infringement can defend herself by proving that she
independently created the allegedly infringing design, even if the prior and
subsequent designs are identical.111 Second, copyright law narrows the
scope of an author’s copyright only to her expression of a particular idea,
rather than to the idea itself. For example, the designer of a jeweled pin the
shape of a bee cannot prevent everyone else from producing bee-shaped
jewelry.112 Third, copyright law’s fair use doctrine permits certain kinds of
copying that are deemed socially valuable or that don’t interfere with the
copyright owner’s market exploitation.113 Although comment and criticism
are the paradigmatic examples of fair use, it can also include instances of
copying that are motivated by the need to access functional features of a
work.114 Finally, copyright law limits the damages that a victorious
infringer can receive. Copyright apportions damages for infringing and
107

Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2nd Cir. 1980).
That law has recently changed in significant respects as a result of the Supreme Court’s Star
Athletica decision. We discuss that decision in Part II.
109
See e.g. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2nd Cir. 2001).
110
Id. But see Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (limiting plaintiff’s copyright
in jellyfish-in-glass sculpture to “thin protection” against only virtually identical copying).
111
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2nd Cir. 1936) (“just as he is no
less an ‘author’ because others have preceded him, so another who follows him, is not a tort-feasor
unless he pirates his work”). On the independent creation doctrine in copyright law see ABRAHAM
DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015).
112
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1971).
113
17 U.S.C. § 107 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.”). For a discussion of the market effect of fair use, see Jeanne Fromer & Mark A. Lemley,
The Audience in IP Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2014).
114
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer
Entertainment v. Connectix Corporation, 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
108
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non-infringing elements.115 That is, even if a design is held to infringe an
existing copyright, the copyright owner can only recover damages based on
the proportion of lost royalties attributable to the copying.116 She cannot
recover royalties attributable to other, non-copyrighted elements of the
infringing product.117
Thus, at least since the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright law has
coupled an incredibly low creativity screen, a low cost of acquisition, and a
long term of protection with a rather robust functionality screen and a
number of doctrines that limit the right’s power. Although purely nonfunctional works could obtain protection with ease, functional works would
be excluded from the regime. In particular, creators of industrial designs
would be channeled into the design patent or utility patent regimes to seek
protection.
2. Design Patents
For creators seeking IP protection over ornamental designs, design
patent law offers the primary alternative to copyright.118 Design patents
protect the ornamental features of a utilitarian article of manufacture.119
While design patent law’s ornamentality requirement has been treated as a
functionality bar, it has been applied in a far more relaxed manner than
copyright law’s useful articles doctrine. Thus, by contrast to copyright law,
where functionality is supposed to be rigorously policed, design patent
doctrine is more tolerant of claims that mix ornamentality with utility.120
Design elements will be eligible for protection whenever there are other
alternatives to the claimed element.121 Because there is often at least one
other way of achieving a function—even if it isn’t quite as good of a way—
design patents will often include substantial functionality that is mixed with
ornamentality.
115

Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989); Frank Music Corp. v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
116
17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
117
Sheldon v. MGM, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). This does not mean that copyright’s damages
provisions are a model of policymaking. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009).
Statutory damages are indeed subject to abuse in copyright law. But the problem occurs primarily
when one defendant is accused of multiple small acts of infringement. That is unlikely to be true in
the design cases we consider here.
118
Congress has considered a number of other design protection regimes in the last hundred
years. See Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles,
37 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 339 (1990). Congress has even adopted a separate design protection
regime for vessel hulls. 17 U.S.C. s. 1301.
119
17 U.S.C. § 171 (design is “for a [utilitarian] article of manufacture”).
120
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10.
121
Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Functionality in Design Protection Systems, 19 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 261, 281–85 (2012).
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Both the Patent and Trademark Office—which oversees design patent
law—and the federal courts have enabled creators to include within the
scope of their patents aspects of designs that are not purely non-functional.
Claimants have been allowed to protect design features that do more than
merely portray appearances or convey information and that, instead,
contribute to how the design works and are valued in substantial part on
their utility. So although design patent claims should be “construed in order
to identify the non-functional aspects of the design,”122 what counts as
“non-functional” in the design patent context is broader than it has been in
copyright law.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has consistently
accommodated design patents that cover aspects of designs that contribute
to a product’s usefulness or efficiency. Consider, for example, the shoe
design at issue in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co. Although each
element of the plaintiff’s shoe design contributed to the shoe’s function, the
court upheld the plaintiff’s design patent because the overall design of the
shoe was not “dictated by the use or purpose of the article.”123 Although
these elements served a utilitarian purpose, they were still protectable
because competitors could achieve the same purpose with different
designs.124 Thus, even though the design elements served a utilitarian
function and even though they may have been the best way to achieve that
function, they were still included within the scope of the plaintiff’s claim.125
In what is perhaps the Federal Circuit’s most comprehensive discussion
of functionality screening, the court in Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.
explained that design patents would only be declared invalid if “ the
patented design is primarily functional rather than ornamental.”126 Thus,
many designs that were substantially functional but not primarily so would
be upheld. Even so, the court “factored out” functional elements of a multifunction tool design from the scope of the plaintiff’s claim when it came to
deciding infringement. These elements included the handle, the hammerhead, and the jaw, because they were “driven purely by utility.”127 The
plaintiff still had a valid patent covering the “ornamental” design of the
tool, which in this case included the shape of the tool’s edges and
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corners.128 But whatever “ornamental” means here, it certainly doesn’t
mean entirely non-functional. The shape of a hand tool’s corners and edges
will contribute significantly to its comfort, manipulability, and wearability.
These are aspects of the design that copyright law’s useful article doctrine
would traditionally have screened out because they are simultaneously
aesthetic and functional.
In Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Corp., the Federal Circuit upheld
the validity and infringement of the rounded corners of the iPhone design,
even while acknowledging that they improved “pocketability” and
“durability.”129 This decision is even more startling in light of that the fact
that, earlier in the same opinion, the court rejected Apple’s claim to trade
dress on the same features on the grounds that they were functional.130 By
including functional features, the court noted, Apple “pursued both ‘beauty’
and functionality.131 Nonetheless, Apple could still draw upon design
patents for IP protection. While copyright (at least until recently) excluded
an item from protection if there was no way to separate its non-functional
and functional aspects, design patent law welcomes designs that intertwine
form and function. The only designs or elements that will be excluded from
design patent’s functionality screen are those that are purely utilitarian.132
Design patents differ from copyrights in a number of other
dimensions that affect their scope and strength. For example, most scholars
think that design patents have a narrower scope than copyrights.133
Variations from a design that copyright law would treat as substantially
similar and thus infringing, design patent law would treat as sufficiently
different and noninfringing.134 In other ways, however, design patents are
more powerful rights than copyrights. There is no independent invention
defense to design patents: if a subsequent design infringes an existing
design patent, it is irrelevant whether or not the designer copied the preexisting design.135 Furthermore, design patent law does not include any
defense akin to copyright law’s fair use provision.136 Finally, when
128
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assessing damages for design patent infringement, judges do not apportion
the value of damages between infringing and non-infringing elements.
Infringers are on the hook for all profits lost because of the infringement,
without respect to the proportion of those profits that were driven by noninfringing elements.137
As we discussed above, granting creators exclusive rights over
partially functional features, as design patent law does, can provide them
with substantial market power. The lack of independent invention or fair
use doctrines and the absence of damages apportionment heighten this
power. This can create costs for consumers, who must pay more for goods
with patented designs, and for subsequent creators, who must license
existing designs or expend resources in designing around them. To lessen
the risks to consumers and other creators, then, Congress made it more
costly and more difficult to obtain protection through design patent law than
through copyright law.
To obtain a design patent, a creator must submit a formal application
to the PTO that depicts the claimed design.138 At the PTO, the claimed
design undergoes examination to determine whether it should be granted or
not.139 Unlike in copyright law, where the work need only be original and
minimally creative to receive protection, the design patent statute requires
that the claimed design be both novel and nonobvious, in parallel with the
requirements for utility patents.140 Novelty here means newness.141 If the
design or a substantially similar one had previously existed, the applicant
shouldn’t receive a patent.142 In addition, if a designer of ordinary skill
would have found it obvious to modify prior designs to create the claimed
design, the applicant shouldn’t receive a design patent.143 As with utility
patents, these requirements are intended to pose a much greater hurdle for
claimants. Only those who have produced a significant innovation in
ornamentality should be given exclusive rights to reproduce and sell it.
In addition, design patents receive substantial shorter protection than
do copyrights. Design patents only last for fifteen years from the date of
REV. 1177 (2000); Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011).
137
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grant.144 This is approximately 85% shorter than the duration of a copyright,
so the benefits that accrue to a rightsholder, and thus the effects on
competition, are substantially curtailed.
*

*

*

The doctrinal screens that set the boundaries between copyright,
design patents, and utility patents thus endeavor collectively to channel
functional and ornamental elements into the proper IP regimes. Recall that
he law’s object is to prevent creators from obtaining rights that would
produce negative social value. By combining creativity thresholds with
functionality limitations, IP law strives to maximize social welfare by
giving creators the correct set of rights. Utility patents are the most natural
home for functional inventions, but they also involve the most exacting
legal standards. Design patents offer some protection for functional
elements, but they similarly require application and examination by the
PTO to determine whether the design meets certain legal benchmarks. This
means that if designers will get the benefits of protection for functionality,
they will have to show that they contributed a significant new design.
Copyrights, by contrast, are easily obtained and last for a long time, but
they generally cannot be used to protect functional elements and are
leavened with other legal defenses that mitigate the ability of designers to
leverage them into market share over functional products.
D.

Costly Screens within IP

The legal doctrines governing copyright and design patent law are
meant to channel designs with functional elements toward design patents
and away from copyright. But this between-regimes doctrinal screen is not
the only relevant barrier to obtaining IP rights. In addition, design patent
law imposes a costly screen, while copyright law does not. Copyrights
spring into being instantly and nearly costlessly.145 This is appropriate, at
least in theory. Because copyrights are not thought to protect functional
elements, they cannot usually provide substantial market power to
designers.146 The independent creation doctrine, as well as the suite of
144
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other doctrines that characterize copyright law, similarly limit the power of
a copyright.147 Copyright law’s functionality screen should thus prevent the
existence of high private value/negative social value rights. In addition,
there should be relatively few low private value/negative social value
copyrights, though potentially some low private value/positive social value
ones.148 These are the conditions under which a costly screen would
normally do more harm than good, and thus it seems appropriate that
copyright law does not establish one.149
With respect to design patents, the opposite is true. Applicants
seeking design patents must first apply to the PTO and have their patent
applications examined, as we have explained. Design patent’s doctrinal
screen—new and nonobvious—is applied ex ante, through this process of
application and examination, rather than only ex post through judicial
review.150 This process of ex ante review creates financial costs for the
applicant. The PTO charges fees of $180 to apply for a design patent,151
$120 to cover the search for prior art,152 $460 to have the patent
examined,153 and $560 for the patent to be issued,154 for a total upfront cost
of $1320. Most applicants also hire professionals to produce the drawings
for the applications, which costs approximately $500,155 and attorneys or
agents to represent them, at a cost of approximately $2000 on average.156
All told, a design patent applicant will spend approximately $5000 to obtain
a valid patent, compared with the $40 spent by a copyright applicant.157
These upfront fees are potentially important. Design patent rights
are powerful: as we explained above, not only can design patents be used to
protect functional elements, they are also not limited by independent
creation or fair use defenses, and victorious design patent plaintiffs can
recover significant damages.158 This has two significant ramifications for
the universe of potential design patents. First, it reduces the likelihood of
low private value/positive social value design patents, just as there are very
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few low private value/positive social value utility patents.159 Design patent
rights are strong enough within their scope to allow their owners to capture
a substantial proportion of the value of any designs they have created.160 If
a patented design is valuable in the marketplace, the design patent owner
will generally be able to realize a significant share of that value.161
Second, despite the operation of doctrinal screens, the power of
design patents raises the prospect of numerous low private value/negative
social value design patents. Each existing design patent increases costs for
future designers in ways that copyrights do not. A new designer who
wishes to patent a design must comb through the thicket of existing designs
to determine whether someone has already patented a similar design.162
This is because there is no independent creation defense to design patent
infringement—even if the second designer has no knowledge of the
patented design, she may still be held liable for infringement.163 By
contrast, an author seeking to protect a design through copyright need not
prove that her design is novel, need not worry about infringing a preexisting design (so long as she did not copy it), and thus need not search the
existing stock of copyrighted designs before proceeding.164 Each newly
granted design patent imposes a small social cost by contributing to the
mass of existing designs that a new designer must navigate.165
In addition, because there is no independent creation defense, even
weak design patents can be used to file nuisance lawsuits and extract
settlements. Potential damages from design patent infringement are so high
that many defendants will settle rather than challenging patents that appear
to be invalid or not infringed.166 This gives rise to the possibility that
owners of design patents that are likely invalid or not infringed might
nonetheless be able to extract small payments from lawsuit targets without
having to litigate those patents to final judgment.167 As in the utility patent
context, these types of lawsuits create negative social value. They impose a
159
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tax on other designers without leading to the contribution of valuable new
designs.168
Although design patent law’s creativity threshold attempts to
exclude negative social value rights when they are insufficiently clever, the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements are imperfect proxies for social
value. Many designs that are new and nonobvious are still nonetheless
undesirable. A designer may create a unique shape for a shoe that turns out
to be both uncomfortable and unattractive. If the patented design turns out
not to be socially useful, then the patent has net negative social value, but
the doctrinal screen would not have been able to eliminate it.
Taken together, these considerations indicate that design patents are
ripe for application of a costly screen. Recall that a costly screen will only
affect the issuance of low private value patents.169 Designers will still seek
high private value patents regardless of any screen—it will just be more
expensive for them to do so. There are very few low private value/positive
social value patents, so a costly screen will not negatively affect any such
grants (or the underlying designs). At the same time, a costly screen might
deter the filing of many low private value/negative social value design
patents. If it simply reduces the number of low-value design patents that are
filed and must later be navigated, that is a social gain; if it similarly reduces
the number of nuisance-value suits that are filed, that would be a benefit as
well.
The upshot is that if the IP system were operating properly, doctrinal
and costly screens would combine to select for predominantly social
welfare-enhancing patents. Copyright’s high functionality screen would
channel any design covering a functional element toward design patents.
There, design patent’s high creativity screen would ensure that only truly
innovative designs were rewarded with patent protection, and the costly
screen would eliminate many (though surely not all) of the weak, negative
social value patents that might otherwise be granted. Designers who opted
out of the high design patent screens and into copyright protection would
receive only a much thinner right that would create many fewer social
costs.170 The problem, as we will demonstrate, is that the doctrinal and
costly screens within copyright and design patent law are not functioning in
this seamless manner.
III. THE BREAKDOWN OF FUNCTIONALITY SCREENING
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Channeling functionality via a combination of doctrinal and costly
screens makes a lot of sense. Ideally, the system should mitigate the risk of
negative social value IP rights by making it difficult and costly for
claimants to obtain protection for functional creations and the market power
that goes with it. Unfortunately, we don’t live in an ideal world, and lately,
the situation has gotten even worse. As we explain below, copyright law’s
high functionality screen for useful articles has vanished, and design patent
law’s high creativity threshold and costly examination do not, in fact, exist.
A.

Star Athletica and the Lowering of Copyright Law’s
Functionality Bar

Under the system established by the 1976 Act, copyright law, with
its virtually nonexistent creativity threshold and nearly costless screen, was
meant to be the home for solely nonfunctional designs or at least the
completely nonfunctional elements of designs.171 The useful articles
doctrine would screen out any utilitarian aspects of an article that were not
capable of being identified separately and existing independently of the
article’s nonfunctional features. In its recent opinion in the case of Star
Athletica v. Varsity Brands, however, the US Supreme Court tore down
copyright law’s high functionality bar and replaced it with one that
resembles design patent law.172
The case involved two-dimensional designs of stripes, chevrons, and
color-blocking that were incorporated into cheerleading uniforms. The
placement of these design features on the uniforms was partially
functional.173 Although the designs may have been visually appealing in
their own right, that’s not why they were chosen. They also served to affect
the appearance of the wearer’s body, emphasizing certain body parts and
deemphasizing others, and to identify the wearer as a cheerleader.174 Unlike
a decal of a team logo or mascot that could be attached to the uniform for
purely nonfunctional reasons, the designs at issue in the case were dualnature—they were simultaneously expressive and utilitarian.175 According
to decades of appellate opinions interpreting the 1976 Act’s useful articles
doctrine, the designs should have been categorically uncopyrightable.176
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Justice Thomas’s opinion for the majority of the Court interpreted
the statute in a much more lenient fashion. According to the Court, design
elements could be copyrightable if they meet two criteria: (1) that the
decisionmaker can spot elements that appear to have pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural qualities and (2) that the feature could exist in a work once it is
imagined apart from the useful article.177 The first step, which the Court
noted was “not onerous,” only seems to require the decisionmaker to find
something at least partially nonfunctional about the design of object, even if
it was intertwined with functional elements. The second step then asks
whether those features could be “imaginatively separated” and depicted or
reproduced in some non-useful article. Because the stripes, chevrons, and
colorblocking “hav[e] pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities,”178 and
because they could have been depicted on a piece of paper or canvas,179
they met the Court’s test for copyrightability.
While this might seem like a fairly straightforward reading of the
statute, its novelty and extremity emerge from Justice Thomas’s discussion
of the nature of the imagining and separating that he has in mind. He
explains that once the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of the article
have been separated, the “imagined remainder” need not be “a fully
functioning useful article at all, much less an equally useful one.”180
Referring to the view that copyright law should only protect solely artistic
features as “flawed,” the majority instead claims that copyright can extend
to a design feature “even if it makes that article more useful.”181 A feature
can now count as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature even
though it imparts significant utility to the article, and indeed even though
the article couldn’t function at all without it. Under this approach,
copyright law can now protect things like aerodynamic elements of a car
that make it drive faster or with less wind resistance, and perhaps even
things like the pattern of tire treads that are designed for functional purposes
but that could be imagined as works of abstract art.
The Court’s opinion in Star Athletica thus fundamentally altered the
nature of copyright law’s functionality screen.182 Instead of jettisoning dualnature features and channeling them to design patent law, copyright law
will now protect features of applied art and industrial design that contribute
to the article’s function. The opinion replaces copyright law’s high doctrinal
screen for functionality with one that in fact resembles design patent law’s
much more accommodating standard—but, of course, while also retaining
177
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copyright law’s low creativity threshold and costless examination and
registration.183
The design at issue in Star Athletica highlights the significance of
this combination of screens. Because the Court lowered copyright law’s
functionality bar, the cheerleading uniforms are not categorically excluded
from protection. Instead, they will only fail to obtain protection if they
cannot meet copyright law’s creativity threshold, which requires that they
be original and more than minimally creative. Given how low that threshold
is, these designs, as trivial and obvious as they are, may still be able to cross
it. Accordingly, the designers would obtain IP protection for functional
aspects of their creations without establishing that they have made a
substantial innovation or even having to pay much money to the
government.184
The risk posed by Star Athletica is clear—creators of highly
functional designs, which typically would have been channeled out of
copyright into design patent law, can now obtain copyright protection.
Copyright’s previously rigorous functionality screen now resembles design
patent’s generous and flexible functionality screen.185
B.

The Failure of Design Patent’s Screens

By contrast to copyright, design patent law is meant to couple laxer
rules on functionality with (1) a high doctrinal creativity screen and (2) a
significant costly screen. In reality, however, neither of these screens is
operating as intended. Consider first the doctrinal screen. At least in
theory, design patents should be subjected to substantial scrutiny to ensure
that they are novel and nonobvious. This is the tradeoff that designers make
in order to obtain the ability to protect functional elements related to
designs and the market power that accompanies it. Designers should only
be able to obtain significant market power if they have contributed a truly
new and innovative design.
In reality, however, design patent’s doctrinal creativity screen is
largely toothless. The PTO rejects only 2% of designs for novelty or
obviousness.186 Moreover, it is not as if this high grant rate is being driven
183

Id.
For example, the Copyright Review Board recently reversed a denial of registration for a
lighting fixture based on Star Athletica, and it found that a very simple crystal mesh pattern was
sufficiently original for copyright protection. See https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/reviewboard/docs/amaca.pdf
185
To be sure, as noted above copyright has other limitations designed to prevent backdoor
utility patents. Two of us have argued elsewhere that those limitations should now come into play to
dramatically narrow the scope of any resulting right. But there is no question that the primary line of
defense against turning copyrights into backdoor utility patents has been breached.
186
Dennis Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
184

32

DESIGN PROTECTION

[3-Nov-17

by the fact that designers are playing it safe and only applying for patents
on designs that are clearly novel. Even a quick perusal of some of the
design patents granted by the PTO reveals that designers are regularly able
to obtain patents on designs that are so familiar they should have been
obvious.187
Design patent law’s creativity screen is failing for two distinct but
related reasons. First, neither the PTO nor the courts appear to treating the
novelty and nonobviousness thresholds as rigorously in design patent law as
they do in utility patent law.188 For known prior art to invalidate a design
patent for lacking novelty, the PTO and courts seem to require that the two
designs be identical in every feature. In the case of Apple v. Samsung, for
example, the Federal Circuit upheld Apple’s design patents on the
rectangular shape of the iPad even though there were very similar
references in the prior art.189
Figure 1: Apple’s Novel and Nonobvious Design

Cases like this illustrate that decisionmakers are simply interpreting
the existing doctrinal to impose a lower hurdle on claimants than the
statutory language suggests. In fact, the creativity threshold in design patent
law is so low that it hardly seems different from copyright law’s originality
requirement.
Further, designers whose patent applications are rejected can keep
coming back to the PTO and filing requests for further examination. No
application can ever be finally rejected; the designer can always refile, and
in so doing wear down the PTO examiner until the patent is finally
(2010).
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granted.190 In this respect, the process for obtaining a design patent mirrors
the process for obtaining a utility patent, which is known to contribute to
the excess of poor-quality utility patents that are granted.
The second reason for design patent law’s incredibly low rejection
rate is that it is quite difficult for the PTO to effectively examine design
patents. Design patents are not as easily searched as utility patents, and
they cannot be identified as easily using keywords. This is part of the
challenge associated with comparisons based entirely on visual claims.191
All told, the PTO has a difficult time determining whether a design is
actually new and nonobvious, and the result is a proliferation of patents that
should not exist.
Both the PTO and defendants are further hampered in challenging
design patents’ validity by recent changes to the doctrines of ornamentality
and functionality.192 While design patent law allows more protection of
hybrid functional-aesthetic elements than copyright law traditionally did, it
should not protect purely utilitarian product features. But recent case law
has all but abandoned that functionality limitation, allowing protection even
of purely functional elements where the alternative is not to protect a
particular element of a design.193 Design patent’s already lax doctrinal
screen has become even laxer.
The Federal Circuit has proven willing to protect even the purely
functional aspects of design as long as they have some relationship with
ornamental ones. For example, in Sport Dimension v. Coleman, the case
mentioned in the Introduction, the design patent at issue covered a life
jacket-style flotation device with armbands.194 During claim construction,
the district court excluded the armbands from the claim, because it found
them to be functional.195 The Federal Circuit agreed that the armbands were
functional, but it held that they were wrongly excluded from the claim.196
Instead, it held that the district court should have viewed the design as a
whole, including the functional features.197 As long as there was some
ornamentation, design patent law would protect that ornamentation even
though it served a functional purpose.198
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Similarly, in Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. Covidien,199 the district court
had “factored out” certain elements of a handle for ultrasonic shears – like
the trigger and an on-off button – that were driven by functional
considerations. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that as long as the
entirety of the design was not fully dictated by functional considerations
courts could not exclude the individually functional elements from
protection.200 It specifically noted that the scope of the design patents
extended to the combination of those elements even though they were
functional.201
Even if courts were to reverse course and apply more traditional
understandings of novelty and functionality, that would be only a partial
solution to the problem. If a design patent is granted, it still has some value
to its owner, even if it is possible (or even likely) that it would later be
invalidated if challenged in court. If the patent’s invalidity is not obvious or
certain, or if the cost of discovering that invalidity is high, the patent’s
owner will usually be able to extract a settlement of some value from an
accused infringer. The settlement may be substantial, if the patent’s validity
is plausible, or it may be merely a nuisance-value settlement. But it will not
be zero. And the settlement value will be enhanced by the high level of
damages available to patent plaintiffs. If design patent owners are able to
realize private value through even invalid patents, they are imposing costs
on consumers and other designers. These are low private value/negative
social value patents that design patent’s failing doctrinal screen is allowing
to slip through.
Such patents should in theory be deterred by design patent’s costly
screen, which would make it sufficiently expensive that applicants would
refrain from trying to obtain these types of invalid patents. In reality,
however, design patent’s costly screen is not nearly as effective as one
might hope. Recall that the total cost of obtaining a design patent is roughly
$5000.202 This is not trivial, but it pales in comparison to the cost of
obtaining a utility patent, which is approximately $35,000 in fees to the
PTO203 and the applicant’s attorney.204 Five thousand dollars is also much
199
200
201

202

796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1334.
Id.

See supra Part I.C.
A utility patent application requires payment of $280 in filing fees, 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a), $600
in search fees, 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(k), $720 in examination fees, 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(o), and $960 in
issuance fees, 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(a)(1), for a total of $2560 in up front fees. The PTO also charges
maintenance fees for patents that remain in force, which total $12,600 over the life of a patent. 37
C.F.R. 1.20(e), (f), (g). Design patents, by contrast, do not need to pay maintenance fees.
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2504.html.
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Most applicants also hire attorneys, and fees for preparing and prosecuting patents typically
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less than what even a dubious design patent might be worth. Again, the
potential for design patent owners to win substantial damages awards due to
the lack of damages apportionment can turn even questionable patents into
valuable private assets. An upfront application cost of $5000 will weed out
only the most frivolous design patent applications while allowing many
others through. In light of the incentives that designers face to file for even
weaker design patents, knowing that they are likely to be granted, this toolow costly screen poses significant problems. Designers can (and do)
obtain multiple patents on different configurations of their designs.205 That
they do this suggests that the costly screen isn’t very costly. And, because
they can submit dozens of applications simultaneously, the costs of drafting
and prosecution are probably even lower.
The upshot is that design patents are too easy to obtain, both as a
matter of doctrine and expense. Design patent law is meant to only award
these powerful IP rights to designers who have contributed valuable new
designs, and it is meant to deter putative applicants from even applying for
low private value/negative social value designs. It accomplishes neither of
these tasks. By consequence, every day there are design patents granted
that do more harm than good, driving up prices for consumers and taxing
genuine creativity. If either the doctrinal screen or the costly screen had
failed independently, the problem would be significant. The simultaneous
and conjoint failures of both screens is calamitous. And it goes some way
toward explaining the dramatic rise in design patenting.

205
Apple v. Samsung Electronics, 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D.
Janis, Virtual Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 107 (2013); Michael J. Risch, Functionality and
Graphical User Interface Design Patents, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 53 (2013).
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Figure 2: Design Patents Issued Per Year206

C.

The Additional Problem with Overlapping Trade Dress Protection

However well or poorly copyright and patent laws might be doing to
properly incentivize innovation in design by channeling creations to the
appropriate doctrine, that task is further complicated by the availability of
design protection via trade dress law. As we explained above, designers can
assert exclusive rights in the shape of a product or its packaging under trade
dress law.207 These rights are not meant to stimulate new creativity in
design, but instead to prevent consumers from being confused about the
product’s origin. For example, if consumers associate the rubber toe bumper
and molding on a shoe as an indication that the shoe was produced by
Converse, then Converse can attempt to use trade dress law to prevent
competitors from making similarly designed shoes.208 But trade dress
protection fits uneasily within the channeling scheme that Congress created
for copyrights and design patents, and it renders the task of screening
designs even more difficult.209
206
This chart was borrowed from Patently-O, https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/08/designpatentsexpected.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PatentlyO
+%28Dennis+Crouch%27s+Patently-O%29.
207
See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
208
Bill Donahue, ITC Spells Out How Broad Use Sunk Converse Sneaker TM, LAW360 (July 14,
2016) available at https://www.law360.com/articles/817642.
209
See Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
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Because trade dress law allows firms to obtain protection for
product design, it shares copyright and design patent laws’ concerns with
extending protection to market power conveying functionality.210 But trade
dress law’s doctrinal and costly screens differ from those used by the other
regimes. Trademark law imposes no creativity threshold for marks or
designs. A design is protectable even if it is identical to prior designs and
was copied from them as long as the claimant can establish that consumers
treat the design as indicating the source of the product.211 This nonthreshold is not even as rigorous as copyright law’s trivial originality
requirement. Trademark protection is, however, subject to a costly screen,
although one that operates differently from patent law’s. Trademarks and
trade dress can be registered with the PTO and, if so, are subject to
examination by the office. While registration will only cost several hundred
dollars, the price for trade dress protection is actually much higher. This is
because trade dress is only protectable once it has acquired
distinctiveness,212 and a company often must spend an enormous amount of
money on marketing to get consumers to associate the design with the
company. So although the examination and fees for trade dress protection
are cheaper than utility patent law’s, trade dress law’s doctrinal screen
requiring secondary meaning for protection actually imposes a substantial
cost.
Trade dress law also imposes a doctrinal functionality screen that
resembles the one copyright law used prior to Star Athletica.213 To the
extent that a producer attempts to claim protection for an aspect of the
design that is “necessary to the success of the article or . . . affects the cost
or quality of the article,” it is unprotectable.214 This functionality screen is
more rigorous than design patent law’s (and presumably the post-Star
Athletica copyright screen), as demonstrated by Apple v. Samsung, where
the Federal Circuit treated features of the iPhone as unprotectable by trade
dress law but protectable by design patent law.215 Whether courts and the
PTO apply the functionality screen with consistent rigor is a separate issue.
For example, the registered trade dress of Coca-Cola’s distinctive bottle

873 (2010). Cf. Robert Bone, Trademark Functionality Reexamined, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183
(2015).
210
Id.
211
The design is protectable if it has acquired “secondary meaning” as a designation of the
source of the goods.
212
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212-14 (2000).
213
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10.
214
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (holding that a dual
spring design for a sign could not receive trademark protection because it was functional, as
evidenced by an expired utility patent).
215
Apple, 786 F.3d at 989-99.
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design or Converse’s rubber toe bumper and molding both contribute to
their designs’ functionality.216
Trade dress law isn’t part of Congress’s scheme to optimize
innovation in design by channeling creations to the correct regime, and it
sits awkwardly alongside that scheme.217 Although it imposes a significant
functionality bar and an indirectly costly screen, trade dress law has no
creativity threshold.218 Moreover, trade dress protection, once obtained, can
last forever.219 As we explained above, creativity thresholds operate as
doctrinal screens that minimize the risk of high private value-negative
social value rights by requiring the claimant to have produced something
innovative.220 Trade dress law makes no effort to ensure that rights are only
granted to designs that contribute to social welfare.221 Accordingly, it must
rely entirely on its functionality screen to prevent designers from obtaining
rights that will hinder competition and innovation.
D.

The Dystopian Reality of IP Screening

The principal concern generated by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Star Athletica is that copyright law will no longer rigorously police
functionality. This would allow designers to obtain protection for the
functional elements of designs via copyright without having to overcome
design patent law’s high creativity threshold, short duration, and costly
screen. This protection would then last for a century, rather than design
patent’s 15 years.
As we have just explained, however, many of the benefits of
channeling functional designs away from copyright and into the design
patent regime are chimerical. Very few designs are excluded by the latter’s
doctrinal creativity screens, and its supposedly costly screen isn’t very
costly. Design patent law’s screens are already allowing through nearly
every plausible design. In addition, we suspect that the enormous difference
in duration between copyrights and design patents may not, in fact, be all
that meaningful in practice. Product designs, including those that
216
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incorporate functionality, tend to have relatively short shelf lives,222 so the
market power differences between fifteen years and a century are not that
great. IP protection that covered the shape of a floppy diskette, film
canister, or fax machine would already have virtually zero value, because
those products have become obsolete.223 All the additional years of
copyright protection that would extend beyond the fifteen-year design
patent term would generate little private value or social cost. In cases like
these, where the product is truly obsolete, we would not even expect rights
to have significant nuisance value or impose substantial search costs, since
competitors also aren’t trying to make these products. While some industrial
designs have enduring market value—the Eames chair, the Burberry trench
coat, or the classic Coca-Cola bottle—these are the exceptions that prove
the rule of short shelf life.224
Design patent law isn’t doing its job of limiting the costs of IP
protection for functional designs via short duration, creativity thresholds, or
costly screens. Maybe, then, copyright law’s failure to channel functional
creations to design patent law post-Star Athletica won’t matter so much,
since designers put to the choice might have opted for a design patent over
copyright anyway. If designers do seeks copyrights where they would have
otherwise had to seek design patents, copyright’s limiting doctrines could
play an important role in influencing innovation and competition. As we
explained in Part I, copyright law, but not design patent law, does not
impose liability on competitors who independently create their own
designs.225 Unless a copyright plaintiff can prove that the defendant actually
knew of and copied her design, the infringement action will fail. The holder
of a design patent, by contrast, can recover from anyone who makes or uses
the design, whether they knew of its existence and copied it or not.226 We
suspect that copyright law’s independent creation doctrine is even more
important for industrial design than it is for more typical copyright works
like novels and movies. The opportunities for human cultural expression,
while not infinite, are, nonetheless, vast.227 Although Judge Learned Hand
discusses the possibility that “a man who had never known it [might]
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See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, Act 3, scene 3 (“the fashion wears
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novelty item.
225
Supra notes 83-91; see also Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone is the Judge: Images and
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Robert E. Suggs, A Functional Approach to Copyright Policy, 83 UNIV. CINCINNATI L. REV.
1293, 1302 (2015).

40

DESIGN PROTECTION

[3-Nov-17

compose anew Keats’s ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn,’”228 this is incredibly
unlikely to happen. That two designers of handheld smart phones might hit
upon the same idea for its shape, however, seems not only possible but
probable, given the physical limitations of the human hand.229 Precisely
because industrial design incorporates utilitarian features which tolerate
fairly few variations, independent creation of the same design is likely to
often occur.
Copyright law’s other limiting doctrines may further minimize the
social costs from diminished competition relative to design patent law.
Copyright law’s infringement analysis should filter out functional aspects of
the design even if the useful articles doctrine no longer does, limiting the
comparison between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works to their
expressive, non-functional features.230 Courts have done this for other
highly functional works like computer software and architecture, and we
hope that they will continue the practice now that they will have to deal
with industrial designs.231 A similar analogy holds for copyright’s fair use
doctrine, which can vitiate defendants’ prima facie liability if they can show
that their copying was based on functional necessity.232 Imagine, for
example, that a car manufacturer attempted to control the market for
replacement or add-on parts for its vehicles by claiming a copyright over
their design—something that might now be possible in light of Star
Athletica. If the only way that competitors could produce interoperable parts
were to copy aspects of the manufacturer’s design, the competitors would
have a strong argument for fair use based on computer software caselaw.233
Design patent law does not have comparable doctrines and so subjects
defendants to potential liability for copying functional components of the
plaintiff’s design.
Finally, recall that copyright law has a much more sensible approach
to infringement damages than design patent law.234 When design patent law
calculates the plaintiff’s damages, it does not apportion value based on
infringing and non-infringing elements of the defendant’s design. The
228
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defendant must pay for all of the plaintiff’s lost profits.235 Copyright law,
however, limits the plaintiff’s recovery to any royalties that were
attributable to the defendant’s infringement.236 The plaintiff won’t recover
for any losses that may have arose from similarity between non-copyrighted
elements of the design. This difference means that the potential negative
social value from nuisance suits will be lower in copyright infringement
cases than in design patent cases, all else equal, so the risks to competition
from inappropriately granted rights will also be lower.
Yet all of this good news about copyright does not tell the whole
story. Even if copyrights after Star Athletica are still no stronger than
design patents on the whole, this does not mean that Star Athletica has done
no harm. And it does not mean that if design law overreaches, it still
overreaches largely through design patents. There are two reasons for this.
First, while the costly screen of design patents isn’t very costly, it is still
more expensive than obtaining a copyright, which is effectively free.237 The
choice between copyright and design patent protection is a tradeoff between
cost and strength of protection. Increasing the strength of copyright
protection without increasing its cost makes choosing copyright more
attractive.
The second reason is more fundamental: designers are not required
to select only one of the available design regimes. There is no doctrine of
election that requires a designer to choose between copyright and design
patent when obtaining IP over a design. Rather, any designer can seek both
types of protection for the same designs, without limitation. In addition, the
designer is also able to seek trade dress protection running parallel to
copyright and design patent protection. The existence of trade dress
protection intersecting with the channeling regime that Congress designed
for copyrights and design patents further complicates the murky picture for
design law. Instead of a simple world of channeling between copyright
law’s low creativity threshold, high functionality bar, and costless screen
and design patent law’s high creativity threshold, low functionality bar, and
costly screen, we must add trade dress law’s unusual combination of
screens and its different aims. Determining how to distribute rights over
product design in an optimal fashion is thus even harder.
The ability to choose copyright, trade dress, and design patent
protection for the same design element creates all sorts of opportunities for
designers to exploit the overlapping advantages of these systems. For
instance, it is typically easier for a plaintiff to prove that a design patent is
infringed than to prove that a copyright is infringed, for reasons we have
235

Id.
Id.
237
See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
236

42

DESIGN PROTECTION

[3-Nov-17

detailed above. At the same time, it is typically more difficult for a
defendant to prove that a copyright is invalid than to prove that a design
patent is invalid. (Design patents are only valid if they are novel and
nonobvious, while copyright contains no such limitation.) Accordingly, a
designer could seek both copyrights and design patents and choose which
right to enforce against a given defendant depending upon whether that
defendant is likely to have better defenses related to infringement—in
which case the plaintiff will assert design patents—or invalidity—in which
case the plaintiff will assert copyrights.
Similarly, designers can choose which rights to assert to maximize
their potential damages recovery. If the design encompasses all aspects of
the infringing product, the designer can assert copyrights, knowing that she
will be able to obtain essentially full damages because the profit is
attributable entirely to the design. If the infringing product involves both
infringing and non-infringing design elements, the plaintiff can elect instead
to assert design patent rights in order to avoid having damages apportioned
and, for instance, capture the profits of an entire car based solely on the
design of the chassis.238
Copyrights also offer the option of obtaining what amount to
“design patent lite” protection for decades after the design patent has
expired. The designer could rely upon the more powerful design patents for
the first 15 years, then switch to copyrights after the design patents have
expired. As we explained, in many cases the extra decades of protection
will be largely irrelevant.239 But the ability to capture those additional outyears of rents will be valuable to some designers, and these designers can
do so at roughly zero cost.
Most importantly, and most realistically, designers can assert both
types of rights against the same defendants in the same cases.240 If the two
causes of action are at all independent—that is, if they do not rise or fall on
precisely the same factors—designers will have two bites at the same apple.
Even if the design patent claim founders for some reason, the copyright
claim may still prevail, or vice versa. Simply as a matter of mathematics, a
238
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design plaintiff can transform two dubious rights into one source of strong
protection. For instance, imagine that a design patent and a copyright are
each only 50% likely to be found valid and infringed by a particular
defendant design. If the two causes of action are completely independent,
the plaintiff is 75% likely to prevail on at least one of the two. Of course, it
is unlikely that the two causes of action will ever be entirely independent,
particularly on the issue of infringement. But even partial independence will
allow the IP holder to leverage them in litigation beyond what the
underlying design warrants. Moreover, by bringing two claims instead of
one, the plaintiff will increase the defendant’s litigation costs to defend
through trial. In other contexts, scholars have demonstrated that offering IP
rights-holders the choice between two legal regimes can artificially inflate
the power of IP rights and distort the operation of the IP system.241 Option
value by itself is bad enough. Permitting designers to opt for both IP
regimes is potentially far worse.
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The problem, then, is simple, if counterintuitive: it’s too easy and
too cheap to protect the functional aspects of designs. The law gives people
too many ways to obtain too many rights too cheaply. As a result, IP law
grants design rights that are broader than they should be, rights that aren’t
worth the social cost to have around, and rights that overlap in ways that
undo the calibration individual IP regimes are supposed to provide. In this
section, we consider policy changes designed to bring private costs and
benefits more in line with social welfare.
A.

Reining in Overpowered Design Rights

One set of approaches focuses on the fact that design rights have
become too powerful, inducing too many designers to seek and enforce
protection even when it is not socially optimal to do so (for instance, when
the defendant independently created their design and it is not identical). We
consider several approaches to mitigate the excessive power of design rights
in this section.
Many of the problems discussed above stem from the ability of IP
owners to use tools directed at ornamentation (design patent, copyright) or
reputation (trademark) to achieve what the law intends only utility patents
241
Omri Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 15-18 (2011)
(describing the distortions introduced when plaintiffs have the option of selecting between two
damages regimes).
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to provide: control over the function of the item itself.242 One solution to
the problem is to try to shore up the screens that prevent design-related
rights from bleeding over into backdoor utility patents. This won’t make
design rights more costly, but it will reduce the ability to capture
inappropriate value—value in excess of what the designer has really
created—with those rights. It will therefore reduce the temptation to invest
in negative social value rights that generate positive private value. A
number of scholars have suggested ways to shore up these screens.243
As we mentioned in Part II, neither the PTO nor the courts seem to
be applying the nominally high creativity threshold that design patent law
demands. Patent law’s novelty and nonobviousness standards are intended
to impose a significant hurdle for claimants. But while the PTO and the
courts have demonstrated some willingness to reject utility patents on these
grounds, they have not done so for design patents.244 When prior art
discloses a design that substantially anticipates the principal features of the
claimant’s design, as with Apple’s patent on a rectangle with rounded
corners, the PTO should deny the patent or the courts should invalidate it.
Design patent law shouldn’t grant substantially stronger protection than
copyright while simultaneously applying a similarly trivial creativity
threshold.
Copyright has the converse problem. Just as design patent law has
begun to resemble copyright’s lax approach to creativity screening, so too
has copyright’s functionality screen moved towards design patent law’s lax
functionality standard.245
But there may still be ways for courts to restore the division between
design and function that Congress intended. In design patents, the
effective elimination of the functionality screen is a creation of the Federal
Circuit. It finds no basis in Supreme Court precedent, and it is at odds with
the way functionality is treated in trademark cases. Indeed, in Apple v.
Samsung, the Federal Circuit went so far as to hold that the very same
features both were functional under trademark law and were not functional
under design patent law.246 The Supreme Court declined to resolve that
issue, rejecting the design patent verdict on damages instead.247 The Court
should take a case to resolve this issue, and when it does, it should
reintroduce an effective form of functionality screening to design patents,
as the statute requires and as historically was true before recent Federal
242
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Circuit decisions.248 Applying Richardson and rejecting Coleman would
be a good start.
Copyright functionality is a somewhat harder problem, because the
Supreme Court seemed to suggest in Star Athletica that copyright could
protect even the functional aspects of a utilitarian work as long as courts
could envision creative elements in that work.249 That risks making
copyright design protection cheap indeed, while eliminating the filters on
scope that prevented every copyright in a utilitarian work from becoming
an automatic backdoor utility patent.250 It’s not clear that the Court
intended to dismantle the functionality screen in copyright, rather than
simply concluding that there was something worth protecting in a simple
design for a cheerleader uniform. And it is entirely possible that courts
interpreting Star Athletica will grant protection to such works but narrow
the scope of that protection to avoid effectively copyrighting function.251
That’s what we think they should do, if the case isn’t going to be changed
by statute.252 Doing so would reduce the incidence of cheap copyrights
with negative social value that impede the creation of others. But there is
no question that Star Athletica made the line between design protection
and functional IP rights fuzzier than ever. In an ideal world Congress
would pass new legislation overriding Star Athletica and restoring the
traditional meaning of section 101. But since that seems unlikely, courts
will need to consider other options.
B.

Election of Rights

A second way to tackle the problem of cheap backdoor utility
patents is to focus on the problem of overlap between IP rights. As we
noted in Part I, at least before Star Athletica different IP regimes were
calibrated in different ways. Design patents were intended to be rarer, more
costly, shorter, and harder to get than copyrights, but they conferred
significantly stronger rights. Copyrights were cheap and simple to get, but
came with significant limitations designed to prevent their use as backdoor
utility patents. And trademark law has special requirements that limit its
248
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use to particular circumstances in which a design is valued not for what it is,
but for what it represents. In the best-case scenario, creations would be
channeled to the one correct doctrinal bucket that appropriately balanced
costs and benefits for designs of that type. When the channeling doctrines
didn’t work as well, the designer of a particular article could treat IP rights
as a menu of options, choosing the IP right that provides the most valuable
fit for her needs.
The concept of one choice from a menu of options was an
appropriate metaphor for much of IP law’s history. Under the doctrine of
election, a creator had to choose one – but only one – form of protection for
her work.253 We don’t mean that a design couldn’t fall within the subject
matter of more than one IP regime; it is well established that copyright,
design patent, utility patent, and trade dress might overlap in what they
cover. Rather, the doctrine of election meant that where two or more IP
rights did overlap, the IP owner had to choose which form of protection she
wanted. Obtaining a design patent meant foregoing copyright protection
for the same item, and vice versa. A copyright or design patent over a work
meant the shape of the work wasn’t also eligible for trade dress
protection.254 The doctrine of election meant that there wasn’t any problem
of overlapping rights, because there weren’t multiple rights to overlap.
The doctrine of election was rejected by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in 1974 in In re Yardley.255 That case held that a watch
featuring a caricature of then-Vice President Spiro Agnew could be both
copyrighted and design patented. Yardley was based on the (correct)
proposition that different IP rights have different purposes, and if a work
has many parts it may be appropriate to protect different parts with different
regimes. We have no quarrel with that reasoning. Indeed, utility patents
and design patents have long protected different aspects of the same
product.256 But the absence of a doctrine of election has increasingly meant
253

See Douglas R. Wolf, The Doctrine of Elections: Has the Need to Choose Been Lost?, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 439, 439 (1991) (“Historically, the Doctrine of Elections (“Doctrine”)
limited the creator of an ornamental design to only one form of protection. Over time, the Doctrine
has been substantially abandoned.”). For a detailed discussion of this history, see Jason du Mont &
Mark D. Janis, U.S. Design Patent Law: A Historical Look at the Design Patent/Copyright Interface,
in The Copyright/Design Interface: Past, Present & Future (Estelle Derclaye ed.) (Cambridge Univ.
Press, forthcoming 2017).
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In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Korzybski v. Underwood Underwood, Inc., 36
F.2d 727 (2nd Cir. 1929); De Jonge Co. v. Breuker Kessler Co., 182 F. 150 (3rd Cir. 1910); Jones
Bros. Co. v. J.W. Underkoffler et al., 16 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1936); Taylor Instrument Cos. v.
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protected by both design patents and utility patents).
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that IP owners use different IP regimes to protect the same aspects of their
works, leading to overlapping protection.257 Thus, a designer might obtain
a design patent with its relatively strong rights, then claim a copyright in the
same aspects of the work once the design patent expires, and even claim a
trademark in the design should the copyright ever expire.258 As we
described in Part III, this allows a designer to leverage the advantages of all
of these systems simultaneously, rather than accepting the limitations of a
given system as the price of obtaining its benefits.259 The result is a further
increase in the power of design rights created purely by this option value.
Perhaps it is time to bring back the doctrine of election, at least to
the extent that any particular design feature may be protected by only one
form of IP.260 The fact that it is too cheap and easy to get strong protection
for designs means we want some way to limit the power IP grants over
design. An election doctrine would not solve all the problems we identified
in Part III. If it is too easy to get design patents, the fact that a designer
can’t also get copyright protection on the work doesn’t fix that. And if it is
too easy to protect functionality through copyright, the fact that a designer
can’t also obtain a design patent doesn’t fix that either. But requiring
election would solve an important class of cases in which we make design
protection too cheap and too strong – cases in which the IP owner benefits
from layering different protections to avoid the limits of each doctrine. That
is particularly true when short-term rights like utility and design patents
expire. Giving long-term or even perpetual protection through copyright or
trade dress to elements that also got the benefits of strong patent rights
undoes the public benefit of the patent bargain: the promise that the world
will have access to the design once the patent expires.
Bringing back election would not necessarily require legislative
action. The history of the election doctrine is curious, because its demise in
the copyright and design patent context can be traced to one case from a
single court of appeals, In re Yardley.261 True, that court—the Court of
257

See Quan v. Ty, Inc. supra note XX.
The oldest of us is fifty years old, and copyrights have never expired in any of our lifetimes
because Congress keeps retroactively extending copyright terms. The most recent extension added
twenty years to copyright terms, and that was nineteen years ago. We’ll see this year if it happens
again.
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OddzOn v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (refusing Koosh ball copyright registration
where product was already patented; patentee wanted the benefits of easier enforcement through
copyright).
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For an early suggestion that we should do something similar with software, see Michael J. Kline,
Requiring an Election of Preotection for Patentable/Copyrightable Computer Programs, 6 COMP. L.J. 607 (1986).
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To the extent Congress thought about the issue at all, it seems to have assumed that copyright
protection was possible for utilitarian works only if the IP owner had not obtained a design patent for
the same work. Herbert Putnam, Esq., then Librarian of Congress and active in the movement to
amend the copyright laws, told the joint meeting of the House and Senate Committees:
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Claims and Patent Appeals—heard all appeals from the Patent and
Trademark Office, but at the time it didn’t even hear infringement suits.
Meanwhile, at the time of Yardley the regional circuits and district courts
had unanimously adopted the doctrine of election. Nonetheless, the
influential Nimmer treatise endorsed Yardley,262 and after Yardley people
just started taking it for granted that a designer could protect the same
design element using multiple IP regimes.
The Copyright Office
acquiesced in 1995, allowing registration of works that had already been
patented.263
Since Yardley, the IP world has taken for granted that overlapping
protection is the norm. But the Supreme Court has never endorsed the
elimination of the election doctrine. Indeed, there are good reasons to think
it would not do so. Election is a commonplace in other areas of IP. Anyone
who files for a patent must elect to forego trade secret protection, and
choosing trade secrecy similarly prevents later obtaining a patent.264 In one
important decision the Court seemed to implement an election doctrine
between copyright and trademark, sharply limiting the ability of IP owners
to assert trademark claims that effectively protected copyrighted works once
those copyrights had expired.265 In another, the Court held that an expired
utility patent was strong evidence that a design feature was functional and
could not be protected by trademark law.266 And it has repeatedly held that
design patents preempt state design-like rights because of concerns that
overlapping protection would allow IP owners to circumvent the
requirements of federal design patent law.267 Congress too endorsed the
doctrine of election when it created a new IP right covering boat hulls,
expressly providing that obtaining a design patent prevented the designer
from also obtaining or enforcing a registered right for boat hulls.268 While

The term `works of art' is deliberately intended as a broader specification than `works of
the fine arts' in the present statute with the idea that there is subject-matter (for instance, of
applied design, not yet within the province of design patents), which may properly be
entitled to protection under the copyright law.
Quoted in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
262
DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §2.19 (1994 ed).
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Copyright Office Circular, 60 Fed. Reg. 15605 (Mar. 24, 1995),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1995-03-24/html/95-7363.htm.
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See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
2017 ch. 2.
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the Court has not considered the overlap problem in the context of
copyright law,269 we think it should draw the same conclusions there.270
Reinvigorating the doctrine of election is somewhat more
complicated since the 1976 Copyright Act, because copyright protection is
automatic. Surely one does not “elect” copyright over design patent
protection merely by creating a work that the law deems automatically
within the scope of copyright. We think the doctrine of election should
attach at the time a designer files for a design or utility patent on a product
attribute. Doing so should represent a choice not to enforce any copyright
claim on that attribute. Our proposal is that courts should dismiss copyright
lawsuits or applications for registration that are brought on the basis of
elements that are already protected by an existing (or pending) patent. The
creator would still own the copyright and remain an author of the work. But
she could not enforce that copyright in court. Similarly, the Copyright
Office should refuse to register a copyright on subject matter for which a
patent has already been filed.
Conversely, bringing (or perhaps threatening) a copyright lawsuit
based on a product attribute should estop later efforts to patent (or enforce a
patent on) that product attribute. The PTO should also dismiss any patent
application that tries to claim an element that has already been the subject
matter of a copyright registration or litigation. We focus here upon
registration, litigation, and application because they are public acts that
occur at discrete moments in time. It would be comparatively difficult (or
impossible) to base election on the moment at which a copyright is created,
simply because copyrights spring into existence instantaneously the
moment that an author creates a work. Registration and litigation are when
269
Mazer v. Stein acknowledged the doctrine of election in the case law but declined to rule on it
one way or the other. 347 U.S. 201, 205 (1954).
270
Indeed, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), the Court
restricted the scope of trademark protection for product configurations because it was concerned that
trademark law could otherwise be used to circumvent the limitations then imposed by copyright law.
It is true that in Star Athletica the Court allowed for the possibility that design patent and copyright
could protect the same utilitarian articles:

Moreover, we have long held that design patent and copyright are not mutually exclusive.
See Mazer. Congress has provided limited copyright protection for certain features of
industrial design, and approaching the statute with presumptive hostility toward protection
for industrial design would undermine Congress’ choice.
Star Athletica at 1016. But that statement is not inconsistent with the doctrine of election. The Court
held that the fact that something was eligible for design patent protection didn’t disqualify it from
copyright protection. But it did not hold that IP owners could hold both forms of protection over the
same element at the same time. The same is true of J.E.M. Ag. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534
U.S. 124 (2001), which held that the developers of new plants could choose utility patents rather than
plant patents or a plant variety protection certificate. Election necessarily presupposes that the IP
owner has more than one type of right it could employ; the point is that it must choose between them.
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that copyright becomes publicly known and reified. There is of course the
possibility that parties might try to game this rule, particularly during the
period during which a patent application is held secret. But we think it will
function well in most circumstances. And it is certainly an improvement on
the status quo.
We think election must be limited to individual features of a
product, rather than necessarily encompassing the product as a whole.
Complex products can have different attributes for which different IP rights
are appropriate. The design of an iPhone is different from the operation of
the WiFi technology inside that phone, and enforcing rights in one
shouldn’t prevent enforcement of the other. By contrast, there is no reason
for Apple to be able to use design patent, copyright, and trademark to
enforce rights in the same design element (the shame of the phone).
Election would prevent disturbing results such as what occurred in Apple v.
Samsung, where a failed trade dress case nonetheless prevailed under a
design patent theory.271
C. Narrowing the Scope of Design Rights
A final approach to the problem of too-powerful design rights would
be to narrow the scope and power of the rights we grant. The functionality
screens in copyright and design patent were intended to do that,272 but as we
have seen, they aren’t working. Congress could, however, impose limits on
the strength of design patent rights to better align private and social value.
One possibility is to change the current rule on design patent damages.
Unlike every other area of IP, a finding of design patent infringement
entitles the plaintiff to capture the defendant’s entire profit from the “article
of manufacture” without any consideration of how valuable the design
actually was or what else contributed to the price of the defendant’s
product.273 As one of us has observed elsewhere, that rule makes no
sense.274 The Supreme Court may have narrowed its reach in Samsung v.
Apple by permitting courts to define “article of manufacture” narrowly,275
but a rule that doesn’t consider the relative value of the design patent and
other features of a product is absurd. Eliminating it and applying the
normal rules of IP damages would help tackle the problem of overpowered
design patents.
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Second, we might consider introducing an independent invention
defense to design patents, as we have in copyright law. The ease of
obtaining design patents and the ability to seek profits way out of
proportion to the value of the design has led some to worry about the
problem of “design patent trolls,” plaintiffs who use their design patents to
try to strategically capture value in others’ similar designs rather than
simply preventing knock-off products.276 The rise of patents on individual
images rather than the shape of an overall product exacerbates this risk.277
Scholars have debated whether utility patents should have a defense for
independent invention.278 But even if they shouldn’t, such a defense might
make sense for design patents, which are closer in purpose to copyright than
to utility patent. A design patent shouldn’t inhibit design simply to allow its
owner to engage in rent seeking; the right’s real purpose is to prevent close
imitation from destroying the incentives to invest in design. Requiring
plaintiffs to prove copying would be consistent with that purpose. Doing so
would, however, require Congress to act.
There may be other ways to narrow the scope of design rights. The
current practice of “dotted line” drawings allows patentees to claim a
particular curve or feature divorced from the product as a whole.279 And the
use of black-and-white drawings means that designs can infringe even if the
colors of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s actual products are not particularly
similar.280 We might instead require the plaintiff to submit a photo or a
CAD drawing of the actual or intended product. Doing so would require
more similarity between the plaintiff’s design and the defendant’s product
before finding infringement.
D.

Raising the Cost of Design Protection

A different set of solutions to the problem of socially harmful design
rights involves not weakening those rights but making the screening
mechanism for design protection more effective. Doing so would make
obtaining design rights more costly, and perhaps impossible for some
claimants. This might dissuade firms from filing applications for especially
dubious design patents, reducing the number of low private value/negative
276
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social value patents in existence and mitigating the design patent troll
problem.
One way to start is to improve the examination process. As we have
seen, design patents are virtually never rejected at the PTO on the merits
because of similarity to other designs. While this is not proof that the PTO,
as currently constituted, is poorly equipped to examine design patents, there
are reasons to think that the agency is in fact hamstrung. The PTO likely
has a very difficult time locating relevant design prior art. And it rarely
issues even initial rejections, suggesting that the PTO isn’t simply
narrowing design patents to appropriate scope before allowing them. This
situation might have been tolerable at some point in the past, but even if so,
it is no longer. As the scope and power of design patents expand, the PTO’s
ability to locate prior art needs to expand as well. We might invest in
improved search tools designed to find prior art and pay more attention to
novelty in the examination process.281 Examiners should also properly
apply the ornamentality and functionality requirements, weeding out claims
that are not properly the subject of design patent protection at all.
Simultaneously, we should increase the cost of seeking or
maintaining design patent protection. This would be the most direct way of
establishing a meaningful costly screen to design patents.282 There is reason
to be skeptical that an increase in utility patent fees will deter that much
patent enforcement, because the value of utility patents is highly skewed.283
But design patents may actually be a better target for cost-based screening,
both because the value of many designs is lower and because there is not a
well-established market for the sale of design patents to trolls. A typical
utility patent will cost roughly $35,000 to obtain and maintain throughout
its twenty-year lifetime.284 Perhaps design patents should not cost quite this
much, but the cost should be higher than the current $5000.285 In particular,
while owners of utility patents must pay maintenance fees to keep a patent
in force throughout its lifetime, the PTO imposes no such fees on owners of
design patents.286 The PTO should consider imposing maintenance fees
during the later part of a design patent term, just as it does for utility
patents. This could prevent opportunistic enforcement while still giving
design patent owners the ability to prevent rapid copying.287 The PTO
281
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283
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charges $12,600 to maintain a utility patent over the course of its full
twenty-year term.288 Design patents last 75% as long, and so as a rough
rule of thumb the PTO should consider imposing 75% of that total, or
$9,000 in design patent maintenance fees.289
These two approaches are complementary. Higher examination fees
would both increase the potency of design patent’s costly screen and
provide funding for improved substantive examination—that is, a more
effective creativity screen.290 Moreover, they would likely do so without
deterring much (if any) valuable design creation. This is only one of a
menu of options that various IP policymakers could pursue. But for the
reasons we have detailed, we think it is an especially promising one.
We could also increase the cost of enforcing both copyrights and
design patents. While litigation is expensive for both plaintiffs and
defendants, IP owners can often use the threat of litigation to scare parties
making lawful uses into quitting. And the existence of contingent-fee
lawyers means that litigation is often more costly for defendants than for
plaintiffs. So we might increase the cost of litigation, for example by
charging a substantial fee to file an IP infringement suit or perhaps even a
small fee to send threat letters. Raising the cost of enforcement rather than
acquisition would allow us to apply a costly screen to copyright as well as
design patent law. And it might have the added benefit of parties to acquire
design patents cheaply so long as they didn’t use them to threaten others.
E.

Optimal Design Screening

While each of these approaches would help solve the problem, their
effects are cumulative, and we worry that pulling on too many levers at the
same time might overshoot the mark. In this section we discuss how these
different approaches might overlap.
If someone put us in charge of the world,291 our optimal system for
screening design would look something like this. For purposes of this
effects of maintenance fees as a means of eliminating harmful patents while preserving valid and
valuable ones).
288
See supra note 203.
289
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To be clear, we’re imagining a triumvirate in which the three of us takes turns running the
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exercise, we will assume that the appropriate term for IP protection is, in
some cases at least, non-zero and that the current durations for IP rights are
basically correct.
We would start with doctrinal screens as the first-order solution.
Beginning with copyright law, we would return to a world that resembled
the one that existed prior to Star Athletica. Copyright law should have
virtually no creativity threshold and a relatively low ex ante costly screen,
but it should rigorously police functionality.292 Only those aspects of
designs that are exclusively non-functional should be accorded copyright
protection. The Second Circuit’s opinion in Brandir and Judge Kanne’s
dissenting opinion in Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products293
come closest to our view of copyright’s optimal functionality screen.
Design patent law would then serve as the appropriate home for aspects
of designs that are simultaneously functional and non-functional, but it
would properly exclude features of designs that were entirely functional
from both the claim construction and the infringement analysis. As a matter
of functionality screening, the opinions in Richardson and Apple seem to
strike the balance correctly. We would, however, impose a much stricter
creativity threshold on these designs than the PTO and the courts have done.
Only when a design is truly creative should design patent law accord it
protection. This would help minimize the number of negative social welfare
patents.
In an ideal world we might not need costly screens at all. As we
explained above, however, creativity thresholds are imperfect proxies for
social welfare, and we don’t think courts will get it right all the time. So it
makes sense to impose upon design patent claimants a substantially costly
screen. This includes application and maintenance fees that more closely
tracked those imposed by utility patent law and perhaps an enforcement fee
as well. In addition, in a second-best world we would impose a doctrine of
election that would prevent claimants from asserting both copyright and
design patent rights. That wouldn’t be as much of a problem if we properly
defined the roles of each, but we still need to prevent inappropriate overlap.
Establishing a perfect system would require a combination of
legislative, judicial, and administrative action that we suspect is unlikely to
occur. But half steps are better than none, and any of the proposals we
outline in this section is likely to improve social welfare.
various branches of government in three-year terms. After a round robin miniature golf tournament,
we have determined that the initial distribution of responsibilities is Executive: Masur, Judiciary:
Lemley, Legislative: Buccafusco. Eminem will serve as ambassador to the United Nations.
292
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CONCLUSION
The mechanisms IP law has created to separate design protection
from utility patent protection aren’t working. Today it is too cheap and too
easy to get design protection that is too broad. And because designers don’t
have to choose between IP regimes but can take advantage of all of them at
once, the failure of any particular IP regime to get the balance right
reverberates throughout other doctrines.
We suggest several ways to bring design protection back into
balance. We can force people to choose only one form of protection for any
given design element. We can make it harder to get stronger rights or rights
that tread on what is properly the ground of utility patent law. And, finally,
we can make it more expensive for designers to insulate themselves from
competition. Perhaps perversely, one of the ways to encourage good design
may be to make protecting it more expensive.

